This experimental study investigates the use of audits as a control instrument in capital budgeting processes and factors that contribute to audit efficiency (or inefficiency) in a repeated relationship. We disentangle reputation aspects of superiors and subordinates from an increased social...

Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in...

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegationof decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the divisionmanager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the...

Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in...

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the...

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the...