occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and generically causes inefficiency. Interestingly, redistribution arises … decreasing efficiency, which becomes more severe as the centralized budget increases. We also analyze partial ex-ante commitment … through alternative decision-making institutions: Both majority rule and exogenous tax rules can improve efficiency. …

gives an inefficient result in the presence of income asymmetry between member nations. Interestingly, redistribution arises … decreasing efficiency, which becomes more severe as the centralized budget increases. We also analyze partial ex-ante commitment … through alternative decision-making institutions: Both majority rule and exogenous tax rules can improve efficiency. …

occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and generically causes inefficiency. Interestingly, redistribution arises … decreasing efficiency, which becomes more severe as the centralized budget increases. We also analyze partial ex-ante commitment … through alternative decision-making institutions: Both majority rule and exogenous tax rules can improve efficiency. …

unstructured bargaining gives an inefficient result. We find, however, that efficiency is achieved with fully homogenous countries …, and when countries have similar incomes and the union budget is small. Moreover, some redistribution arises endogenously …, entails a tradeoff between equality and efficiency. We also analyze alternative institutions and find that majority rule can …

unstructured bargaining gives an inefficient result. We find, however, that efficiency is achieved with fully homogenous countries …, and when countries have similar incomes and the union budget is small. Moreover, some redistribution arises endogenously …, entails a trade-off between equality and efficiency. We also analyze alternative institutions and find that majority rule can …