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Auctions where incomes are private information and preferences (non quasi-linear) are common knowledge

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 2010

We consider a two good world where an individual i with income mi has utility function u(x,y), where x belongs to [0,infinity) and y belongs {0,1}. We first derive the valuation (maximum price that he is willing to pay for the object) for good y as a function of his income. Then we consider the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677599

Reciprocal dumping and trade policy

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: The journal of international trade & economic development 7 (1998) 4, pp. 439-449

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001254565

Quantity versus price in a homogeneous product duopoly

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: Bulletin of economic research 48 (1996) 1, pp. 83-91

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001196933

Is a unique Cournot equilibrium locally stable?

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: Games and economic behavior 32 (2000) 2, pp. 206-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001520847

Debt financing with limited liability and quantity competition

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: Seoul journal of economics 12 (1999) 3, pp. 295-305

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001418601

On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 5 (1995), pp. 19-32

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Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: Journal of economic theory 75 (1997) 1, pp. 205-212

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001221907

On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: European economic review : EER 48 (2004) 3, pp. 549-562

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Collusive outcomes in price competition

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - In: Journal of economics 73 (2001) 1, pp. 81-93

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001578996

Auctions where incomes are private information and preferences (non quasi-linear) are common knowledge

Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2010

We consider a two good world where an individual i with income mi has utility function u (x, y), where x ? [0, ?) and y ? {0, 1}. We first derive the valuation (maximum price that he is willing to pay for the object) for good y as a function of his income. Then we consider the following problem....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655780