This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a strategic interaction between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium outcomes of our game based on an international duopoly model with...

This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly...

Recent empirics suggest the relevance of transport cost reductions for world trade growth along with eliminations in protectionist trade barriers. To address the welfare effects of trade cost reductions in a context of `trade and the environment,' we develop a two-stage game model where...

This paper examines how the opening of trade affects a countryfs welfare in the context of an international polluting duopoly model with transboundary stock pollution. In this framework, we show that trade liberalization can have quite different welfare implications, depending on the mode of...

This paper constructs a reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade in network goods to consider the implications of network externalities for an optimal tari policy and the welfare eects of bilateral tari reductions. We show that the degree of network externalities nontrivially aects the...

Taking into account non-constant marginal costs, this paper considers the eects of a tari cut combined with a consumption tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and market access. We show that welfare, government revenue, and market access can all improve with this policy reform under...

Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two dierent leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to...

Formulating a dynamic game model of a world exhaustible resource market, this paper studies welfare implications of Stackelberg leaderships for an individual country and the world. We overcome the problem of time-inconsistency by imposing a \credibility condition" on the Markovian strategy of...

This paper explores some implications of the comparison between feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for growth and welfare in a `voracity' model. We show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium involves a lower growth rate while it leaves both the leaders and...

This paper develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of Efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply...