We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable, and...

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable, and...

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable, and...

This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium model with endogenous growth where governements behave strategically in the provision of productive infrastructure. The public capitals enter both national and foreign production as an external input, and they are financed by a flat tax on...

This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium model with endogenous growth where governments behave strategically in the provision of productive infrastructure. The public capitals enter both national and foreign production as an external input, and they are …nanced by a at tax on...

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group fighting, i.e. the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the role of leader behavior in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly chosen leader of the group determines...

We consider a dynamic model of non-renewable resource extraction under the assumption that players do not know their opponents' utility functions.[...]

We consider a situation, in which a regulator believes that constraining a complex good created jointly by competitive agents, is socially desirable. Individual levels of outputs that generate the constrained amount of the externality can be computed as a Pareto efficient solution of the agents'...

In this paper, we combine a matching model derived from Pissarides (2000) in the case of large .rms with monopolistic competition on the product market and the model of intra.rm bargaining à la Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Moreover, we allow for increasing returns to scale in the aggregate...