We implement a dynamic asset pricing experiment in the spirit of Lucas (1978) with storable assets and non-storable cash. In the first treatment, we impose diminishing marginal returns to cash to incentivize consumption smoothing across periods. We find that subjects use the asset to smooth...

This appendix provides proofs and the entire set of data used in Corbae and Duffy (2006)` ``Experiments with Network Formation''. In particular we show that for the environment laid out in that paper` a marriage network is not only the ex-ante efficient network` but also stable in the sense of...

We examine determinancy and expectational stability (learnability) of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in sticky price New Keynesian (NK) models of the monetary transmission mechanism. We consider three different New Keynesian models: a labor-only model and two models that add capital --...

How do norms of trust and reciprocity arise? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects play a series of indefinitely repeated trust games. Players are randomly and anonymously matched each period. The parameters of the game are chosen so as to support...

We report results from a laboratory experiment that provides the first direct test of the pivotal voter model. This model predicts that voters will rationally choose to vote only if their expected benefit from voting outweighs the cost. The expected benefit calculation involves the use of the...

Charities often devise fund-raising strategies that exploit natural human competitiveness in combination with the desire for public recognition. We explore whether institutions promoting competition can affect altruistic giving - even when possibilities for public acclaim are minimal. In a...

We experimentally examine equilibrium refinements in static and dynamic binary choice games of complete information with strategic complementarities known as “entry†games. Our aim is to assess the predictive power of two different equilibrium selection principles. In static entry...

We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning...

We examine how groups of agents form trading networks in the presence of idiosyncratic risk and the possibility of contagion. Specifically, in our model, four agents play a two-stage, finitely repeated game. In the first stage, the network structure is endogenously determined in a noncooperative...