This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and the intrinsic pacifism of the occupier, affect the nature of the movement against occupation. A two-stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and the external occupier fight over the control...

This paper extends Gupta (2010), which proposes a mechanism for the structuring of international institutions for the efficient provision of global security. In that paper, the level of threat by a rogue nation was assumed as being exogenously determined. This paper uses a similar framework to...

This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and the intrinsic hawkishness or pacifism of the occupier, affect the nature of the movement against occupation. A two-stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and an external occupier fight over...

This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to efficiently provision global security against the threat of a rogue nation. The effects of security effort by an alliance member are assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable for other members. Specifically, this...

This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to efficiently provision global security against the threat of a rogue nation. The effects of security effort by an alliance member are assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable for other members. Specifically, this...

In this paper, we present a general model of media capture where a government attempts to buy-out media firms in order to engage in corruption with relative immunity. In particular, we relax the assumption made by Besley and Prat (2005) that each firm would individually be able to completely...