(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se presenta un modelo de ciclo político presupuestario racional para una economía abierta en el que las devaluaciones se demoran en el período preelectoral, a fin de aumentar las probabilidades electorales del partido oficialista. Los...

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the...

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the...

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for the open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the run-up to elections, in order to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on the closed economy, previous political cycle models had...