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This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases. We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001599126
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796532
This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases. We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292004
In three chapters I study the formation of social networks, and the impact the structures that arise may have in various economic settings. First, I develop a model of social network formation with heterogeneous agents and incomplete information. The model predicts an equilibrium in which agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009477798
In this dissertation I examine a set of crucial topics in the political economy of international trade, with an emphasis on firm-level heterogeneity. The first chapter is an empirical study of the new trade theories in which firm heterogeneity and trade costs play central roles in shaping the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009477887
We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting over ``reform projects''. These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later bring a payoff; consequently, older people are more conservative (against reforms) than younger ones. We show that if people...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515512
In real-life elections, vote-counting is often imperfect. We analyze the consequences of such imperfections in plurality and runoff rule voting games. We call a strategy profile a robust equilibrium if it is an equilibrium if the probability of a miscount is positive but small. All robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852091
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