This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium...

This article depicts a location game in a circular market. The equivalence results between a convex and a concave transport cost are reexamined by assuming an arbitrary length. In contrast to previous research the solution found shows that the equivalence relationship depends on the space...

Under quadratic transportation costs, the existence of the sequential first-locate-thenprice equilibrium in spatial competition is well known in the literature. In this paper, we find that the equilibrium may fail to exist under certain restrictions with respect to the location of firms and...

This article considers a model of spatial competition where firms and consumers are located in a semicircular space rather than in the whole circle (Salop's model) or the linear city (Hotelling's model), under the assumptions of both, convex and concave, transportation costs. The paper tries to...

This study aims to examine urban zoning within a linear city in a Bertrand duopolistic competition framework with price discrimination and linear transportation costs. It analyses the effects of introducing an environmental area where economic and residential activity are not allowed. The...

This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium...