This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from...

This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from...

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to study the impact of the related parties' transactions (RPTs) on firm value, and to identify the ownership and governance characteristics of companies that engage in this type of transactions. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses 3SLS...

In this paper we examine the influence of minority expropriation on disclosure level in France where shareholders are poorly protected and the main agency problem is the one between controlling and minority shareholders (type II conflict) while prior studies have been undertaken in the United...

Over the past few decades, the rapid growth of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has received interest from academics and practitioners. While M&As continue to be the subject of thorough investigation from a corporate governance standpoint, comparatively less effort has been made to organize and...

We examine whether worker representation on corporate boards results in improved monitoring or payroll maximization. Several economic theories predict that worker representatives would use control and voting rights in the boardroom to transform firm assets into private benefits and increased...

Since Black (1976), the source of the stock price volatility smirk has remained a controversy. The volatility smirk is a side effect of agency conflict. An important distinction is that the smirk occurs in the optimum, even after agency conflict has been resolved. The slope of the smirk is found...

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of board experience and independence on mitigating agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a panel data of 137 firms listed on stock exchanges in Ghana and Nigeria over a period...

Purpose – Agency theory suggests that if managers are not monitored, takeover negotiations may be contaminated by agency conflicts, which may weaken a firm's bargaining position. This paper argues that some blockholders are more effective monitors than others, and tests whether the negotiating...