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Public Procurement in Times of Crisis : The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891764

Public Contracting for Private Innovation : Government Expertise, Decision Rights, and Performance Outcomes

Bruce, Joshua R. - 2018

We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917011

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement : Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

Hoppe, Eva I. - 2012

A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116354

The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered : Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2023

We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two major shortcomings. First, it is focused on ex-ante investment incentives, whereas ex-post inefficiencies which are ubiquitous in the real world cannot be explained. Second,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348766

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling may either …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015264929

Sequential Procurement Auctions with Risk-Averse Suppliers

Nishimura, Takeshi - 2012

We compare two procurement mechanisms, bundling and unbundling, in a two-stage auction model with risk-averse suppliers … that an increase in the aggregate risk renders bundling less preferable to unbundling, from the viewpoint of both the buyer … and the society. The result still holds even if subcontracting is possible under bundling. On the other hand, an increase …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099394

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2021

investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling may either …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249035

Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk : Evidence from Procurement

Lewis, Gregory - 2013

Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091947

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - 2020

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488