This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal...

We study a market-entry game with a second-mover advantage. In the symmetric equilibrium, there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the probability with which a player will invest (entry) and the length of time until the deadline. Moreover, the probability of investment can move...

We explore an investment game where industry sunk costs provide anincentive for a firm to be a follower into the market as opposedto a leader. For some parameter values, every firm could have adominant strategy to wait, even though immediate entry is sociallyoptimal - this is a like prisoners'...

We take a coordination game and add the option to wait each player can opt to take an action in the standard game or they can decide to wait. If one player has taken a standard option, the waiting player can adopt their best response to this action. Interpreting the payoff in the final period...