In this paper we consider a model where boundedly rational agents choose both which coordination game to play and what action to take in that game, when their information and mobility is limited and change over time. We completely characterize both short-run and long-run outcomes. There are...

We replicate the analysis conducted by Frederiksen, 2022a. We focus on assessing the computational and robustness replicability of their work. We find that their main exhibits and supplementary analysis are replicable, both when running their original Stata replication package, and when we...

This study pushes our understanding of research reliability by reproducing and replicating claims from 110 papers in leading economic and political science journals. The analysis involves computational reproducibility checks and robustness assessments. It reveals several patterns. First, we...

Agenda procedures are an important aspect of political decision making in legislatures. This paper compares different agenda forms and evaluates them on their ability to amalgamate information. I model voters with private information, but subject to party pressures, voting in a common value...

This paper examines the consequences and limitations of the contestation relation [Schwartz, 1990]. In doing so, a new family of tournament solutions are introduced and related to existing refinements of the Banks set [Banks, 1985]. Additionally, the connection between the contestation relation...

Moser et al. (2009) provide one formalization of heresthetics – the “art of political strategy” – in collective choice settings. In doing so they introduce the heresthetically stable set as the set of outcomes least susceptible to manipulation of issue dimension. In this paper we examine...

We extend classical ideal point estimation to allow voters to have different preferences when voting in different domains – for example when voting on agricultural policy than when voting on defense policy. Our scaling procedure results in estimated ideal points on a common scale. As a result,...

In many theories of group choice a dominance relation expressing the ability of alternatives to "defeat" or replace others is the central object on which various solutions are based. I present and argue for the use of a particular sub-relation of the dominance relation called the ultimate...