This paper considers a Cournot duopoly game with endogenous organization structures. There are two firms A and B who compete in the retail market, where A is more efficient than B. Prior to competition in the retail stage, firms simultaneously choose their organization structures which can be...

This paper proposes simple tax policies that can alleviate the distortive effects of royalties. We consider a Cournot duopoly under decreasing returns where one of the firms has a patented technology that it can license to its rival using combinations of royalties and fixed fees. Under optimal...

Patent licensing agreements among competing firms usually involve royalties which are often considered to be anticompetitive as they raise market prices. In this paper we propose simple tax policies than can alleviate the effect of royalties. Considering a Cournot duopoly where firms produce...

We consider a Cournot duopoly with strategic delegation, where quantities of firms are chosen by their managers. A firm can offer its manager one of the two incentive contracts: the profit incentive or the revenue incentive. We show that in this setting there are Nash equilibria in which an...

We consider a Cournot duopoly under general demand and cost functions, where an incumbent patentee has a cost reducing technology that it can license to its rival by using combinations of royalties and upfront fees (two-part tariffs). We show that for drastic technologies: (a) licensing occurs...

We present examples of cost-asymmetric duopoly games where the inefficient firm can obtain higher payoff than its efficient rival. Firms compete in a Cournot fashion and their quantities are chosen by their managers. We assume that managers are offered two types of incentive contracts, the pure...