If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of...

A seller contracts and potentially colludes with a certification intermediary. We investigate the intermediary's incentives to collude, her pricing strategy and the extent to which buyers rely on the intermediary's announcements. The probability of collusion is an endogenous variable, determined...

The authors analyze the possibility of tradeoffs between efficiency and equity as well as the possibility of distributional conflicts in the context of renegotiation of infrastructure contracts in developing countries. To do so, they present a model in which contracts are awarded by auctioning...

An experimental design using treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism is used to test household efficiency. Efficiency is decisively rejected in all treatments contrary to the assumption of most household models. Information on initial endowments of spouses improves efficiency only in...