We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in, and choose the amount of their sector-specific investments in human and...

We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a...

We consider Roy's economies with perfectly competitive labor markets and asymmetric information. Firms choose their investments in physical capital before observing the characteristics of the labor markets they will face. We provide conditions under which equilibrium allocations are constrained...

We study the efficiency properties of equilibria in a neighborhood of economies with Pareto optimal (PO) initial endowments, when the number of agents is finitely large. We provide conditions under which, for all the economies in some open neighborhood of the PO reference economy, all the...

We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a...

We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in, and choose the amount of their sector-specific investments in human and...

Bei unvollkommenen Märkten und numerairen Vermögen gibt es eine offene Menge an Volkswirtschaften, so dass die Gleichgewichtsverteilung durch eine veränderte Anfangsverteilung verbessert werden kann. Dies stärkt das klassische Ergebnis der eingeschränkten Pareto Ineffizienz von...