We investigate equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions with asymmetric reserve prices. For example, the auctioneer may set a low reserve price for one subset of bidders and a high reserve price for others. When used to pursue a distributional objective, lowering the reserve price for some...

Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Focusing on the two-bidder case, we identify new sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding...

This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in economies with general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local monopoly power that is amplified by an economy's endogenous...

We investigate equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions with asymmetric reserve prices. For example, the auctioneer may set a low reserve price for one subset of bidders and a high reserve price for others. When used to pursue a distributional objective, lowering the reserve price for some...

This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in economies with general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local monopoly power that is amplified by an economy's endogenous...