We study the decision making of a financial institution in the presence of a novel implementation friction that gives rise to operational risk. Operational risk naturally arises whenever the institution faces a trade-off between adopting a more sophisticated investment model and one that is less...

We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...

We study the equilibrium implications of a multi-asset economy in which asset managers are subject to different benchmarks, and demonstrate how heterogeneous benchmarking generates a mechanism through which fundamental shocks propagate across assets. Fluctuations in asset managers' capital...

We study qualitative information disclosure by mutual funds when investors learn from these disclosures in addition to past performance. We show theoretically that fund managers with specialized strategies optimally choose to disclose detailed strategy descriptions, while managers with...

This paper studies the dynamic risk management of highly-levered financial institutions within a structural model of credit risk. We consider a context in which systemic default induces externalities that amplify the private cost of financial distress. This represents a source of strategic...

We propose a theory of self-selection by mutual fund managers into picking and timing strategies. With adverse selection, investors learn more easily about the skill of picking funds than of timing funds, since picking investments are less correlated than timing investments. The equilibrium...

Decomposing mutual funds' tracking error into its idiosyncratic and systematic components is informative about funds' intention to implement picking and timing strategies. Accordingly, we define the fraction of a fund's active return variance that is idiosyncratic as the fund's degree of picking...

We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...