A cornerstone of the law and economics approach to standard form contracts is the Òinformed minorityÓ hypothesis: in competitive markets, a minority of term-conscious buyers is enough to discipline sellers from offering unfavorable boilerplate terms. The informed minority argument is widely...

Standard form contracts are pervasive. Many legal academics believe that they are unfair. Some scholars and some courts have argued that sellers with market power or facing little competitive pressure may impose one-sided standard form terms that limit their obligation to consumers. This paper...

Dispute resolution clauses are a common and potentially important component of many types of standard form contracts. I examine the use of dispute resolution clauses in 597 end-user license agreements (EULAs) of software packages sold online. I find that 75% of EULAs include choice of law...

We explore learning and change in standard form contracts. We hypothesize that drafters (sellers) are more likely to revise the terms they offer when they have an opportunity to learn about their value. These opportunities arise only for those types of terms that allow drafters to experience the...

Nobody reads fine print — even when it matters. The most common regulatory approach to attenuate the (perceived) problem of non-readership has long been mandatory disclosure. Despite it’s theoretical appeal, disclosure has not been found to be fully effective in practice. In More Than You...

Disclosure has long been the preferred regulatory approach to prevent one-sided standard-form contract terms, but its efficacy is unclear. For disclosure to be effective, it must increase readership of contracts and, conditional on reading, affect decisions. I use clickstream data on software...