This study investigates whether firms revise executive bonus compensation targets based on past performance. Studies in this area suffer from a lack of detailed information related to executive performance targets. Using mandatory disclosures of executive compensation information under the U.S....

Prior studies often examine the association between performance and various measures of incentive strength. We argue that target difficulty is another important but often overlooked driver of managerial performance. Using data on earnings targets in annual bonus plans, we construct and validate...

We examine boards of directors' subjective adjustments to objective performance measures in executive incentive contracts. Using a unique hand-collected sample of adjusted earnings per share measures used to determine executives' annual bonuses, we provide large-sample evidence that subjective...

We examine the effect of option listing on the stock-price response to quarterly earnings announcements. We find that option trading reduces the magnitude of the pre-earnings announcement drift. We also present evidence that firms with options exhibit more intensive price reactions to earnings...

We examine the importance of bonus contract characteristics, specifically with respect to the relation between EPS-based bonuses and share repurchases. We find that managers are more (less) likely to repurchase shares and spend more (less) on repurchases when as-if EPS just misses (exceeds) the...

This study examines whether and how the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, which allows executives to reduce the sensitivity of their equity-based compensation to the firm’s stock price performance, affects firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We find a...