We consider a market where privately informed sellers resort to certification to overcome adverse selection. There is uncertainty about the certifier's ability to generate accurate information. The profit of a monopolistic certifier is an inverted U-shaped function of his reputation for...

We offer an equilibrium model of cryptocurrency pricing and confront it to new data on bitcoin transactional benefits and costs. The model emphasises that the fundamental value of the cryptocurrency is the stream of net transactional benefits it will provide, which depend on its future prices....

We study a model in which firms compete preemptively for trading opportunities and risk management introduces latency in trading. As the time pressure faced by firms is endogenous to risk management choices, strategic complementarities can trigger a “race to the bottom” where prioritizing...

I study the impact of capital market imperfections on the exercise of a real option. An entrepreneur has private information about a venture for which she seeks outside funding. An initial investment gives access to a continuous flow of information about the project. The duration of that...

The paper presents a theory of optimal transparency when financial institutions are exposed to rollover risk. Transparency enhances the stability of the financial system during crises but has destabilizing effects in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency...

We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank-specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency...

We show that by lending to merchants and monitoring them, an e-commerce platform can price-discriminate between merchants with high and low financial constraints: the platform offers credit priced below market rates and designed to select merchants with lower capital or collateral while...

We consider a market where privately informed sellers resort to certification to overcome adverse selection. There is uncertainty about the certifier's ability to generate accurate information. The profit of a monopolistic certifier is an inverted U-shaped function of his reputation for...