A larger CEO network can reduce the cost of equity by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders, and by increasing trust between the firm and stakeholders. Alternatively, a larger CEO network can increase the cost of equity because higher CEO connectedness encourages greater...

Directors are more likely to obtain additional directorships, especially at prestigious firms, if the CEOs of their current boards are well-connected. Recommended directors do not become beholden to the CEO, as CEO compensation is unaffected and an analysis of appointment announcement returns...

We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as...

I examine whether suppliers modify trading strategies upon their customers’ unionization. I demonstrate that when customers unionize, suppliers experience negative stock returns and rely less on the unionized customers for sales. Results are robust to alternatively using a regression...

I examine whether suppliers modify trading strategies upon their customers’ unionization. I demonstrate that when customers unionize, suppliers experience negative stock returns and rely less on the unionized customers for sales. Results are robust to alternatively using a regression...