Because of conflicting incentives among participants, collaborations (e.g., strategic alliances, joint ventures, and work teams) present a significant control challenge to managerial accountants. On the one hand, formal controls such as sanctioning and monitoring systems improve cooperation by...

In this study we examine the effect of incentive contract framing on agent effort in an incomplete contract setting. Prior research suggests that when governed by complete incentive contracts, agents exert greater effort under penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts. However, in an...

This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal...

Using archival data from the U.S. passenger airline industry, this study examines whether management control mechanisms aimed at mitigating moral hazard explain outsourcing decisions over and above transaction cost economics (TCE) determinants documented in prior research. Consistent with TCE...

Firm boundaries no longer define the relevant entity for performance management for many firms. Competitive forces, deregulated economies and technological advances have reduced the costs of transacting with external parties and diminished the value of vertical integration. At the same time, the...

We examine employees' subjective valuations of their stock options in terms of their distribution around firms' opportunity cost of issuing options. Using both “real-world” and experiment data, we show that a significant proportion of employees (30 percent) and experiment participants (47...

We examine how competition in supplier industries affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using the Input-Output Accounts Data (IO Data) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure. We then predict and find that...