This study theoretically investigates energy-saving investment incentives in duopolies. First, we investigate a binary choice model in which each firm chooses whether to make an energy-saving investment and then they face Cournot competition. We focus on the incentive to become the leading firm...

We compare emission cap commitment that restricts total emissions and emission intensity commitment that restricts emissions per unit of output as measures of self-regulation. The monopolist chooses either emission cap commitment or emission intensity commitment and sets the target level under...

We revisit command-and-control regulations and compare their efficiencies, in particular, an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per unit of output under emission equivalence. We find that in both the most stringent...

We theoretically investigate how common ownership (or the extent of collusion in an industry) affects firms' voluntary commitment with emission restrictions and emissions abatement activities in an oligopoly. We find that common ownership reduces emissions by reducing output, and may stimulate...

A theoretical investigation is conducted on how common ownership (or the extent of cooperation in an industry) affects firms' incentives to adopt green fuel in an oligopoly. The findings show that common ownership hinders the switch from brown to green fuels in two ways. First, an increase in...

We investigate polluter lobbying against near-zero emission targets in a monopoly market. To this end, we compare three typical environmental policies---an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions, an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit, and an...