Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitoring and sanctioning between members of a group. However, often we can not allow for punishment and exclude the possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment,...

Настоящая книга представляет собой третье (исправленное и дополненное) издание монографии «Экономическая социодинамика». Ее первое издание вышло в свет в 2000 г....

Содержанием настоящего доклада является попытка построения целостной теории рынков «опекаемых благ», охватывающей совокупность товаров и услуг, производство...

The paper analyzes econometric models of altruistic giving in dictator and public goods games. Using existing data sets, I evaluate internal and external validity of "atheoretic" regression models as well as structural models of random behavior, random coefficients, and random utility,...

Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and voluntary contribution to public goods provision in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories on the evolution of altruistic in-group beneficial behavior in humans. Many of...

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...

The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium, and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may enhance coordination substantially. Besides attracting the players’ choices to itself, such...

We report experimental findings on the impact of network structure on decentralized monitoring and punishment in public goods games. In the environment we study, individuals can only directly monitor and punish their immediate neighbors in an exogenously determined network. We examine...