In general equilibrium models of financial markets, the cpital asset pricing formula does not hold when agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility with constant relative risk aversion. In this paper we examine under which conditions on endownments and dividens the pricing formula provides a...

Stochastic games offer a rich mathematical structure that makes it possible to analyze situations with heterogeneous and interacting economic agents. Depending on the actions of the economic agents, the economic environment changes from one period to another. We focus on stationary equilibrium,...

In this paper we present a new iterative auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisable object. We will show that the bisection auction is computationally more efficient than the classical English auction while it still preserves all characteristics the...

There is a growing body of research in economics that studies the consequences of time-inconsistent preferences. This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium setting. We discuss how the standard notion of competitive equilibrium should be extended in order to...

In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing the concept of a socially structured game. A socially structured game is given by a set of players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for any internal...

There is an extensive litarature claiming that it is often difficult to make use of arbitrage opportunities in financial markets. This paper provides a new reason why existing arbitrage opportunities might not be seized. We consider a world with short-lived securities, no short-selling...

We consider the well-known result of Arrow (1953) that the set of equilibria of an economy with complete markets coincides with the one of an economy with sequentially complete markets. We show by means of two examples that this results is problematic when there exist multiple equilibrium...

This paper is about freedom of choice and rigidity of choice rules as incentive devices. We study the optimal design of an agent's freedom of choice when his information is endogenous and costly to acquire. We show that curtailing the agent's authority over decision-making may be optimal even if...

The assumption of internationally identical factor intensity techniques may be one of the major causes of the HOV model's poor performance. To relax this assumption, detailed input-output data are required to compute the factor intensity techniques used in different countries; however, these...

We analyze answers to household survey questions on whether the respondents' household income has changed in the past twelve months, and on whether the respondents expect their household income to change in the next twelve months. Both questions are answered on a discrete five points scale. The...