In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...

The Serial Cost Sharing Rule has been conceived originally for problems where agents ask for different quantities of an homogeneous private good, the sum of which is produced by a single facility. Two important features of this rule is the equal treatment of equal demands and the protection it...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...

We show that for any market-clearing price, average profits in a symmetric industry cannot exceed the individual profits from the Walrasian output. This immediately implies that a firm itself can guarantee to beat the market by producing the Walrasian output. This property clarifies and...

The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for their work on contract theory. Contract theory is a subfield of game theory where the conflict between the owner - the principal - and the CEO - or agent - is at the centre of interest. In the...

This paper uses the complexity of non-competitive behaviour to provide a new justification for competitive equilibrium in the context of extensive-form market games with a finite number of agents. This paper demonstrates that if rational agents have (at least at the margin) an aversion for...

The importance and the impacts of horizontal multinational corporations in the context of integration and economic growth processes are examined. A noncooperative game with two firms that choose to have either one or two plants located in two asymmetric countries is used. The firms compete...

We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the...