Over the past two decades, an enormous amount of work has been done to improve the Expected Utility model. Two areas have attracted major attention: the possibility of describing unforeseen contingencies and the need to accomodate the kind of behavior ref

In microeconomic analysis functions with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) have frequently been employed. Various properties of increasing quasiconcave aggregator functions with DRS are derived. Furthermore duality in the classical sense as well as of a new type is studied for such aggregator...

Sorting into public sector jobs may be motivated not only by the available income but also by other aspects, such as stronger demand for security or for social usefulness. The demand for larger job security - beside other factors - can be the consequence of family circumstances. We have...

Sorting into public sector jobs may be motivated not only by the available income but also by other aspects, such as stronger demand for security or for social usefulness. The demand for larger job security - beside other factors - can be the consequence of family circumstances. We have...

The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for their work on contract theory. Contract theory is a subfield of game theory where the conflict between the owner - the principal - and the CEO - or agent - is at the centre of interest. In the...

This paper uses the complexity of non-competitive behaviour to provide a new justification for competitive equilibrium in the context of extensive-form market games with a finite number of agents. This paper demonstrates that if rational agents have (at least at the margin) an aversion for...

The importance and the impacts of horizontal multinational corporations in the context of integration and economic growth processes are examined. A noncooperative game with two firms that choose to have either one or two plants located in two asymmetric countries is used. The firms compete...

We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the...

We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one di¤erent agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule...