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Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók

Monostori, Zoltan - 2013

A tanulmány célja az értékpapírok esetében leggyakrabban alkalmazott két aukciós technika (az egyenáras és a diszkriminatív áras aukció) összehasonlító elemzése. A szakirodalom elsősorban az aukció várható bevétele szempontjából elemzi a módszereket. Az elméleti...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015241420

Rational Expectation Can Preclude Trades

Matsuhisa, Takashi; Ishikawa, Ryuichiro - Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University - 2003

We consider a pure exchange economy under uncertainty in which the traders have the non-partition structure of information. They willing to trade the amounts of state-contingent commodities and they know their own expectations. Common knowledge of these conditions among all the traders can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992515

On the nature of fair behavior and its development with age –

Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

Economic decisions have been shown to depend on actual outcomes as well as perceived intentions. In this paper, we examine whether and how the relative importance of outcomes or intentions for economic decision develops with age. We report the result of ultimatum games with children, teens and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247886

Gondolatok a vidékfejlesztési programok értékeléséről: Társasalmi tanulás a LEADER programban

Nemes, Gusztáv; High, Christoher - 2009

This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494412

Coalition Formation in a Contest Game with Three Heterogeneous Players

Vorsatz, Marc - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two …-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul … the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823881