This paper uses the complexity of non-competitive behaviour to provide a new justification for competitive equilibrium in the context of extensive-form market games with a finite number of agents. This paper demonstrates that if rational agents have (at least at the margin) an aversion for...

The assumption of internationally identical factor intensity techniques may be one of the major causes of the HOV model's poor performance. To relax this assumption, detailed input-output data are required to compute the factor intensity techniques used in different countries; however, these...

Taking as an example recent Hungarian currency, it is concluded that the functions of coins and paper money are related to their daily use (trade and payment), but they can have some other dimensions and functions if proper solutions are found. In this way it is argued that these money forms...

The paper discusses the phenomenon of modern convertibility in paper currency system. Unlike the period of metal (mint) value and traditional convertibility, convertibility today has different aspects and dimensions. Furthermore, it is regulated by the International Monetary Fund, but it depends...

On the example of recent coin emissions the author explores the possibilities of managing this form of money and discusses economic effects of such activities.

The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for their work on contract theory. Contract theory is a subfield of game theory where the conflict between the owner - the principal - and the CEO - or agent - is at the centre of interest. In the...

The importance and the impacts of horizontal multinational corporations in the context of integration and economic growth processes are examined. A noncooperative game with two firms that choose to have either one or two plants located in two asymmetric countries is used. The firms compete...

We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the...

We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one di¤erent agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule...

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...