In this article we analyze the remuneration mechanism for the reduction of energy losses, through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The agent represents the power distribution company, which makes investments, or in other words, makes an effort to reduce energy losses. The...

In this article we analyze the remuneration mechanism for the reduction of energy losses, through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The agent represents the power distribution company, which makes investments, or in other words, makes an effort to reduce energy losses. The...

The deterioration of protected natural areas due to over-visiting is a frequent situation. In this article we modelize the management of access to such places in an adverse selection setting. The regulator offers each visitor a contract based on a limited right of access together with a monetary...

Spanish Abstract: Se presenta un análisis económico de la Ley de energía para el campo, (LEC) que examina cómo su diseño afecta los mercados y crea una estructura de información que favorece la extracción de rentas. Mediante modelos sencillos de equilibrio parcial y de agente-principal se...

This paper tests Bester's (1985, 1987) prediction about the separating role ofcontracts that involve both interest rates and collateral in credit markets. To test thisprediction we use data from natural credit markets and controlled experiments. Using asample of credits to small and medium size...

A partir de las teorías del neoinstitucionalismo y de la regulación y usando los modelos de agencia, de incentivos y de contratos, este artículo analiza los problemas de la institucionalidad actual de la industria eléctica colombiana. Se concibe la regulación como un juego de grupos de...

The present work establishes the main structural characteristics of Cooperatives first grade under the postulates of The Agency Theory. Based in our analysis we conclude a series of structural shortcomings related with agency problems. Moreover, possible solutions to these are proposed.

This article evaluates Herbert A. Simon’s contribution to organization theory, placing special emphasis on the criterion of bounded rationality. Simon’s criticism of the orthodox version of organizational bureaucracy is interpreted and his analysis is extended to institutional economics. One...