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Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments

Alberti, Federica; Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 196-204

Like avoiding labor protection laws via foreign subcontractors, banning deception in economic experiments does not … exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who, similar to properly incentivized subcontractors, can … ‘experimenter-participants’ in a dictator experiment and test whether participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048110

Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments

Alberti, Federica; Güth, Werner - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters … experimenter-participants to test whether deception aects behaviour of participant-participants in a dictator experiment and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010551531

Assessing Mental Models via Recording the Decision Deliberations of Pairs

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Güth, Werner; Klempt, Charlotte - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Two participants have to decide jointly, with the discussions preceding their choice being video/audiotaped. For two tasks, one with and one without strategic interaction, we refer to obvious reasoning styles as mental models. The videotaped discussions are analyzed according to which mental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631675

On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Levati, M. Vittoria; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2006

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765093

Incentive Contracts versus Trust in Three-Person Ultimatum Games - An Experimental Study

Büchner, Susanne; Gonzalez, Luis; Güth, Werner; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft

principal-agent experiments (most involving only one agent). We investigate this issue in the context of a three …-person ultimatum experiment, which is simpler and more neutrally framed than traditional principal-agent designs. Contrary to the game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765124

Attitudes toward Private and Collective Risks in Individual and Strategic Choice Situations

Brennan, Geoffrey; Güth, Werner; Gonzalez, Luis G.; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2005

attitudes in an experiment involving choices with and without strategic interaction. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765150

Durable-Goods Monopoly with Privately Known Impatience: A Theoretical and Experimental Study

Güth, Werner; Kröger, Sabine; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: Economic Inquiry 42 (2004) 3, pp. 413-424

-form solution of a two-period game and compare it to the behavior observed in experiments. The data are to a large extent consistent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005564872

Deadline Effects in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study of Concession Sniping with Low or no Costs of Delay*

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Maciejovsky, Boris - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2001

but keep their role as (initial) proposer or responder over the entire experiment. Our findings offer institutional advice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588001

On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Levati, M. Vittoria; … - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 163 (2007) 1, pp. 143-157

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005241787

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation

Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298