We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good. Despite the absence of private valuations, asymmetric information, or risk aversion, bidder strategies do not converge to the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium strategies...

We analyse a bargaining game in which one party, called the buyer, has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants, called sellers. When the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers' goods are highly complementary, efficient, non-dissipative...

This paper embeds security design in a model of evolutionary learning. We consider a competitive and perfect financial market where agents, as in Allen and Gale (1988), have heterogeneous valuations for cash flows. Our point of departure is that, instead of assuming that agents are endowed with...

This paper develops and experimentally implements a simple multi-negotiation bargaining game, in which one agent, called the “developer,†must reach agreements with a series of other agents, called “landowners,†in order to implement a valueincreasing project. The game has a...

We examine corporate security choice by simulating an economy populated by adaptive agents who learn about the structure of security returns and prices through experience. Through a process of evolutionary selection, each agent gravitates toward strategies that generate the highest payoffs....

This paper embeds security design in a model of evolutionary learning. We consider a competitive and perfect financial market where agents, as in Allen and Gale (1988), have heterogeneous valuations for cash flows. Our point of departure is that, instead of assuming that agents are endowed with...