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Regulatory Agencies: Impact on Firm Performance and Social Welfare

Estache, Antonio; A. Rossi, Martin - European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and … - 2009

We explore the relation between the establishment of a regulatory agency and the performance of the electricity sector. We exploit a dataset comprising firmlevel information on a representative sample of 220 electric utilities from 51 development countries for the period 1985 to 2005. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827110

Bidders' Entry and Auctioneers' Rejection: Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions

Estache, Antonio; Iimi, A. - European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and … - 2009

Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827114

Self-Fulfilling Credit Market Freezes

Bebchuk, Lucian; Goldstein, Itay - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010

This paper develops a model of a self-fulfilling credit market freeze and uses it to study alternative governmental responses to such a crisis. We study an economy in which operating firms are interdependent, with their success depending on the ability of other operating firms to obtain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008635935

The Market for Corporate Law

Bar-Gill, Oren; Barzuza, Michal; Bebchuk, Lucian - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 162 (2006) 1, pp. 134-160

This paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. Such competition is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on management's private benefits but not with respect to issues that have such an effect....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823382

Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights

Bebchuk, Lucian; Kraakman, Reinier; Triantis, George - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 1999

This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross … group to maintain a complete lock on the control of a company while holding less than a majority of the cash flow rights …. Finally, we put forward an agenda for research concerning structures separating control from cash flow rights. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828584

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

Bebchuk, Lucian; Neeman, Zvika - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007

they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828985

Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments

Bebchuk, Lucian; Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C.Y. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011

most pronounced for firms for which control contests are especially relevant due to relative underperformance, small firm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147554

Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns

Bebchuk, Lucian; Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C.Y. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010

In an important and influential work, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) show that a trading strategy based on an index of 24 governance provisions (G-Index) would have earned abnormal returns during the 1991-1999 period, and this intriguing finding has attracted much attention ever since it was...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631671

Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers

Bebchuk, Lucian; Ferrell, Allen - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2000

This paper analyzes certain important shortcomings of state competition in corporate law. In particular, we show, with respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of state takeover law, we argue, is consistent with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005778471

The Market for Corporate Law

Bebchuk, Lucian; Bar-Gill, Oren; Barzuza, Michal - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2002

This paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. The analysis provides a full characterization of the equilibrium in this market. Competition among states is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005575549