In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at...

In a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the 2-person bargaining problem. In this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum. If the pie can be divided only in finitely many different...

We analyze the allocative role of money as a numeraire in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets and nominal financial instruments. It is shown that regardless of their return specification nominal assets in net supply increase the consumption risk and...

We use the approach of the reduced Game Property and its converse to characterize the sets of stable and semistable demand vectors. It is shown that although these two concepts are generally very different their axiomatizations are almost the same. Regarding the semistable demand vector we...

The relationship between risk and asset price fluctuations is studied in a stochastic overlapping generations asset pricing model with i.i.d. production shocks. The non-separability of preferences is an important factor in explaining the time paths of asset prices and returns. We show that the...