Showing 1 - 10 of 24
In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of selfenforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850538
In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010703426
We investigate the formation of global climate agreements (= stable grand climate coalitions) in a model, in which climate policy takes the form of carbon emission taxation and fossil fuel and consumption goods are traded on world markets. We expand the model of Eichner and Pethig (2014) by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106441
We investigate the formation of global climate agreements (= stable grand climate coalitions) in a model, in which climate policy takes the form of carbon emission taxation and fossil fuel and consumption goods are traded on world markets. We expand the model of Eichner and Pethig (2014) by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960648
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897159
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948902
In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett, 1994; Rubio and Ulph, 2006), the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056193
This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories’ threat to embargo (potential)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106439
This paper sheds light on the impact of alternative environmental policies on energy demand, global <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${ CO}_2$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mi>O</mi> </mrow> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> emissions, trade, and welfare. For this, we develop an Eaton–Kortum type general equilibrium model of international trade which includes an energy sector. We...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154604
This paper assesses the role of a larger degree of common language use between the populations of two countries on the so-called extensive product margin of trade. We focus on the overlap of products exported or imported between any pair of countries. The results suggest that the effect of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775096