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Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cox, Caleb A. - In: Journal of Public Economics 121 (2015) C, pp. 52-65

, despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experiment, contributions indeed fall short of the equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190981

Signaling and search in humanitarian giving: models of donor and organization behavior in the humanitarian space

Wardell, Clarence L. - 2009

At its core, this dissertation examines the role of information, particularly as it relates to proxies for quality, and how it affects both donor and organization decision processes in the humanitarian space. In Chapter 2 I consider the context of competition within the sub-sector of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009476014

Dissertation abstract: A status theory of collective action

Willer, Robb - In: Experimental Economics 10 (2007) 2, pp. 189-190

motivation, defined as the relative value an individual places on group versus individual welfare. Individuals are predicted to … higher contributors more, and allocated greater altruism to them in a Dictator game. Study 2 addressed an exchange … outside the group. Study 3 more directly tested the mediating role of group motivation. Contributors who sacrificed a greater …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678692

Dumbing down rational players : learning and teaching in an experimental game

Terracol, Antoine; Vaksmann, Jonathan - HAL - 2007

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750958

Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a Corruption Game – An experimental analysis

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 34 (2013) C, pp. 46-60

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051389

How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication

Bolton, Gary; Brosig-Koch, Jeannette - In: International Journal of Game Theory 41 (2012) 3, pp. 623-649

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010557748

Learning and sophistication in coordination games

Hyndman, Kyle; Terracol, Antoine; Vaksmann, Jonathan - In: Experimental Economics 12 (2009) 4, pp. 450-472

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008527146

Detection Biases in Bluffing - Theory and Experiments

Holm, Håkan - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2004

-pooling equilibrium, in which, the better a player is to detect lies the more often will the opponent player lie. In the experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645100

Face-to-Face Lying – an experimental study in Sweden and Japan

Holm, Håkan J.; Kawagoe, Toshiji - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2008

This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender-receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645161

Dumbing down rational players : Learning and teaching in an experimental game.

Terracol, Antoine; Vaksmann, Jonathan - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696779