Given an objective for a group of three or more agents that satisfies monotonicity and no veto power, Maskin (1977) proposes a two-step procedure for constructing a game that implements the objective in Nash equilibrium. The first step specifies the strategy set of the game and three properties...

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a...

An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of payment are considered: (i) charging the winning buyer a one-time payment; (ii) charging an initial payment followed by a profit sharing contract (PSC) that divides the realized...

Strategic behavior in a finite market can cause inefficiency in the allocation, and market mechanisms differ in how successfully they limit this inefficiency. A method for ranking algorithms in computer science is adapted here to rank market mechanisms according to how quickly inefficiency...