An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are...

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are...

We examine the evolution of corporate capital structures and find that little of the variation in leverage is captured by previously identified determinants, such as size, market-to-book, profitability, industry, etc. Instead, the majority of variation in leverage ratios is driven by an...

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are...

We consider a model of divisible good auctions that allows for both private information and uncertain noncompetitive demand. By placing restrictions on preferences and distributions, we are able to obtain explicit solutions for linear, symmetric strategy equilibria. The model allows us to...

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium...

We show that asymmetry in bidders' capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit common value auctions. This effect seems to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are fundamental differences...

We examine the contracts used to compensate the managers of the seven dual-purpose investment companies that existed between 1967 and 1985 to determine whether financial incentives influence real behavior in the predicted way. The compensation contracts for these funds provided explicit...

The impact of debt capacity on recent tests of competing theories of capital structure is examined. Controlling for debt capacity, the pecking order appears to be a good description of the financing policies of a large sample of firms. The main results are first, that internally generated funds...

Moral hazard and asymmetric information have both been proposed as the motive behind the use of IPO lockup provisions, with each receiving empirical support in the literature. Rather than consider them to be mutually exclusive motivations, we hypothesize that each is dominant for a different set...