High correlations between risks can increase required insurer capital and/or reduce the availability of insurance. For such insurance lines, securitization is rapidly emerging as an alternative form of risk transfer. The ultimate success of securitization in replacing or complementing...

In this article, we examine the benefits that accrue to policyholders and incumbent insurers from an active secondary market for life insurance policies. We begin by examining the benefits of secondary markets in the home mortgage and catastrophic risk insurance industries as points of...

There has been a net propensity over the last decade for the dominant rating agency of the U.S. insurance industry, A.M. Best, to downgrade property-liability insurers. This could reflect a general deteriorating credit worthiness of the industry or an increase in the performance thresholds...

The paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs...

There has been a net propensity over the last decade for the dominant rating agency of the U.S. insurance industry, A.M. Best, to downgrade property-liability insurers. This could reflect a general deteriorating credit worthiness of the industry or an increase in the performance thresholds...

This article shows how the introduction of severity risk into a simple model of insurance markets affects the optimal level of insurance. Also examined is how severity risk affects the equilibrium for an insurance market exhibiting adverse selection in the frequency risk. Individuals are assumed...

Insurance profits exhibit cyclical behavior that has been attributed to capital market constraints. We show that changes in interest rates simultaneously affect the insurer's capital structure and the equilibrium underwriting profit. Depending upon asset and liability maturity structure, capital...

Efficient contracts for sharing risk will allocate risk according to comparative advantage. This article considers insurance markets for earthquake risk and how comparative advantage in risk bearing can explain the amount of business individual insurers write. The respective abilities of...

With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best,...