The authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to lotteries over alternatives. They require virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Under very weak domain restrictions, they show that if there are three or more players, any social choice...

We present a model in which an asset bubble can persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. The resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of arbitrageurs to temporarily coordinate their selling strategies. This synchronization problem, together with the individual incentive to...

We investigate multiple regions in which coordination games are exclusively played by their participants. For every region, there exist a number of immobile individuals locked into this region. There also exist mobile individuals who look out for chances to move into more beneficial regions, but...

The situation in which a decision maker is confronted with decision making problems infinitely many times is considered. She does not know the state-dependent stochastic payoffs, and learns from past experiences according to some adaptive learning rule. She is motivated by the maximization of...

In this paper, we will argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to economics such as industrial organization on the basis of the naïve interpretation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely...

This paper investigates the implementation problem of a social choice function in the complete information environments. We investigate a partial revelation mechanism, in which, each player announces only opinions about her own and two neighbors' utility indices. We require that for every...