This paper analyzes urban land development when landowners anticipate a future large-scale redevelopment by a third party developer. Landowners' initial development activities can deter such redevelopment because they impose two conversion costs on the redeveloper: demolition costs and...

This article analyzes socially optimal bank capital regulations that support fairly-priced deposit insurance. Under full information, banks voluntarily choose a socially optimal interior capital structure based on the cost-benefit tradeoff involved in monitoring loans. Capital regulations are,...

This paper analyzes urban land development when landowners anticipate a future large-scale redevelopment by a third party developer. Landowners' initial development activities can deter such redevelopment because they impose two conversion costs on the redeveloper: demolition costs and...

This article provides incentive compatible regulations that support fairly priced deposit insurance in a competitive banking industry. If informational asymmetry exists between the regulator and banks regarding loan quality, but the regulator can observe actual loan rates charged, then imposing...

This paper provides incentive compatible regulations that support fairly priced deposit insurance in a competitive banking industry. If informational asymmetry exists between the regulator and banks regarding loan quality, but the regulator can observe actual loan rates charged, then imposing a...