The effect that exogenous mistakes, made by players choosing their strategies, have on the dynamic stability for the replicator dynamic is analyzed for both asymmetric and symmetric normal form games. Through these perturbed games, the dynamic solution concept of limit asymptotic stability is...

Incentivized methods for eliciting subjective probabilities in economic experiments present the subject with risky choices or bets that encourage truthful reporting. We discuss the most prominent elicitation methods and their underlying assumptions, provide theoretical comparisons, and propose...

We present methods of belief elicitation which are applicable for any non-trivial utility function. Unlike existing techniques that account for deviations from risk-neutrality, these methods are highly transparent to sub- jects. Rather than identifying beliefs exactly we identify bounds on...

This Paper discovers significant differences between southern and northern Europeans in a dynamic version of the ‘trust game’ played by Ph.D. students from different nationalities at the European University Institute. Our version of the trust game allows subjects to choose the receivers to...

Consider a decision maker who must coordinate his decision with the occurrence of some phenomenon. In order to behave "optimally," the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the phenomenon must be learned. However, there are natural bounds on the capabilities of perception. More...

We provide a simple theory of inflation inertia in a staggered price setting framework à la Calvo (1983). Contrary to Calvo's formulation, the frequency of price changes is allowed to vary according to an evolutionary criterion. Inertia is the direct result of gradual adjustment in this...