Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by...

Majority voting over the nonlinear tax schedules proposed by a continuum of citizen candidates is considered. The analysis extends the finite-individual model of Röell (unpublished manuscript, 2012). Each candidate proposes the tax schedule that is utility maximal for him subject to budget and...

Majority voting over the nonlinear tax schedules proposed by a continuum of citizen candidates is considered. The analysis extends the finite-individual model of Röell (unpublished manuscript, 2012). Each candidate proposes the tax schedule that is utility maximal for him subject to budget and...

A test for spatial independence based on characteristic functions is introduced. The test is shown to be consistent against a fairly general class of alternatives, and the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is determined. The test is then put to use in analyzing the spatial pattern of...

The impact of population aging on the steady-state solution to an Ordover and Phelps (J. Public Econ. 12:1–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1979</CitationRef>) overlapping generations optimal nonlinear income tax problem with two types of worker and quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. A decrease in the rate of...</citationref>

The impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated. In one version, preferences are quasilinear in leisure. For this version, it is shown that it is possible...