We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...

Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of...

In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restrictions and that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. Price rigidities may cause that a competitive equilibrium cannot be attained, and rationing on net demands or supplies is needed to clear...

In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing the concept of a socially structured game. A socially structured game is given by a set of players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for any internal...

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2005, 24, 439-454.<P> Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe...</p>

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2005, 51, 193-212. <P> A cooperative game with transferable utility describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A sharefunction for such games is a function which assigns for every...</p>