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Gul (Econometrica, 1989) introduces a non-cooperative bargaining procedure and claims that the payoffs of the resulting efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibria are close to the Shapley value of the underlying transferable utility game (when the discount factor is close to 1). We exhibit...
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Perfectly competitive economies are economic models with many agents, each of whom is relatively insignificant. This chapter studies the relations between the basic economic concept of competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium, and the game-theoretic solution concept of value. It includes the...
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It is shown here that market crashes and bubbles can arise without external shocks. Sudden changes in behavior may be the result of endogenous information processing. Except for the daily observation of the market, there is no new information, no communication and no coordination between the...
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