We study optimal pricing rules for a public large-value payment system (LVPS) that produces a public good (like prevention of systemic risk) but faces competition by a private LVPS for the private provision of large value payments. We show that the marginal cost of the public LVPS has to be...

We analyze dynamic financial contracting under moral hazard. The ability to rely on future rewards relaxes the tension between incentive and participation constraints relative to the static case. Entrepreneurs are incited to effort by the promise of future payments after several successes and...

The classical Bagehot's conception of a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) that lends to illiquid banks has been criticized on two grounds: on the one hand, the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is not clear cut; on the other a fully collateralized repo market allows Central Banks to...

This paper studies the efficient pricing of large-value payment systems in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity about banks' future payment volumes. It is shown that the optimal pricing scheme for a public monopoly systems involves quantity discounts in the form of a decreasing marginal...

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidity needs as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow banks to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the...

We consider in this paper the problem of a risk-averse firm with limited liability. The firm has to select the size of its investment in a risky project. We show that the optimal exposure to risk of the limited liability firm is always larger than under full liability. Moreover, there exists a...

A paper presented at the October 2003 conference quot;Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms,quot; cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia...

The significant growth in the volume of trade on the large value interbank payment systems and the concomitant massive increase in intraday overdrafts have raised serious concerns about the ability of existing payment systems to allow central banks to cope with wide scale disturbances and to...

In a model where banks play an active role in monitoring borrowers, we analyze the impact of securitization on bankers’ incentives across different macroeconomic scenarios. We show that securitization can be part of the optimal financing scheme for banks, provided banks retain an equity tranche...

Systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank's economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions. Banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims, or by reducing interbank transactions and...