In a series of experiments we show that people learn to play the efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. This result persists despite quite different experiment environments and designs, like different propensities of competition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as a...

For simple sequential games, the payoff structure has certain bargaining power implication. Intuitively, certain actions may have the effect of the carrot and the stick as sanctioning means. Fair outcomes can be alternatively viewed as the consequence of their presence. Experimental data on...

In this paper, the strategy method's impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example,...

Experiments on sequential bargaining have shown that subjects' behavior is far from the equilibrium prediction. Whereas previous models explain these deviations by some kind of social preferences, we investigate an alternative interpretation of behavior based on the assumption of bounded...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore how performance management practices are implicated in the exercise of power with particular reference to the ability of individual managers to balance between more or less institutionalized conceptions of performance while pursuing...

Purpose – The aim is to provide a commentary on “Case studies and differentiated realities”, a paper by Sue Llewellyn, published in Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, Vol. 4 No. 1, 2007. Design/methodology/approach – Examines the ontological statements in Llewellyn's paper...