This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited liability enhances competition and thus the likelihood of bankruptcy. Among efficient auctions in which only...

This paper analyses procurement from two, risk-averse, suppliers who are responsible for the timely delivery of some inputs. Their production is subject to inherent disruptions. We characterize the optimal contracts when suppliers can invest to lower the risk of delays that are costly to the...

This paper explores how an inventor should license an innovation that opens new markets for the licensees. Using a model incorporating product differentiation and network externalities we show that fixed fee licenses are optimal either when there is little competition downstream or when it is...

This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents reading on a technology standard. We develop a model in which manufacturers must buy licenses from different patent owners in order to enter the market for differentiated standard-compliant products. We consider three...

This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited liability enhances competition and thus the likelihood of bankruptcy. Among efficient auctions in which only...

This paper characterizes the optimal contracts issued to suppliers when delivery is subject to disruptions and when they can invest to reduce such a risk. When investment is contractible dual sourcing is generally optimal because it reduces the risk of disruption. The manufacturer (buyer) either...